Category Archives: Capability Analysis

Analyzing Specific Naval and Maritime Platforms

Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation

Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper. Modern Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation. Houston: Harpia Publishing, 2012. 256pp. $64.95

By Lieutenant Commander David Barr, USN

Over the past two decades, the term “modernization” has been widely used by foreign affairs experts, military and political leaders, and intelligence analysts to describe the startling rapidity of the Chinese military’s rise from an arguably primitive force to one of the most technologically-advanced militaries in the world. In his article, “China: A Threat or a Challenge: Its Air Power Potential”, Indian Air Marshall RS Bedi describes modernization as “a dynamic process to keep abreast with the latest” (Bedi, p3). By applying lessons learned from its military actions against U.S. forces during the Korean War and observations made during later conflicts such as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, NATO operations in the Balkans, and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the PLA have kept abreast of the significant role of airpower in modern warfare. Accordingly, both the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) have quickly progressed through this “dynamic process” and have emerged as a force capable of countering American and regional neighbor land- and sea-based airpower, including aircraft carriers, cruise missiles, and long-range bombers. Via informative writing and a litany of glorious, colored and black & white photographs, Modern Chinese Warplanes leads readers along the PLA air forces’ progressive path toward today’s modernized force. Chock full of vivid and informative photographs, readers are immediately transfixed. To invoke a classic adage, if a picture speaks a thousand words, then even a cursory flip through the pages reveals a stunning, photographic summary and leaves the reader eager to investigate the accompanying text.

The first chapter of Modern Chinese Warplanes is dedicated to describing the origins, progressions, and even setbacks of both the PLAAF and the PLANAF, thus providing succinct yet informative context toward understanding how remarkable the modernization of China’s air forces has been. Although the PLAAF and PLANAF were established in 1949 and 1952 respectively, it could be argued that the modernization of today’s force was born from the compelling wake-up call presented to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership during the 1991 U.S.-led military operations in Iraq. Using Rupprecht and Cooper’s description, U.S. operations in Iraq “shocked the PLA into the realization that it had to become capable of engaging in high-tech warfare or otherwise face the certainty of falling ever further behind other modern militaries.” This marked a momentous shift in Chinese national military strategy and the subsequent 1993 issuance of the “The Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” by the CCP and PLA. Thus, if 1993 can be considered the start of China’s current military modernization period, the mere 24-year rise in military capabilities of the PLA, arguably now on par with the world’s leading military forces, is even more remarkable.

After Chapter 1’s useful historical context, Rupprecht and Cooper use Chapters 2 through 6 to succinctly present the book’s stated objective: to provide “a summary of the Chinese air arms as they are today, what equipment they operate, and how this equipment is organized.” Chapters two and three both describe and illustrate China’s modern combat aircraft, combat support aircraft, and associated armament. Chapter two’s introductory pages aptly describe Chinese aviation nomenclature and unique designations but then seemingly gloss over China’s numerous aircraft manufacturing companies. Admittedly this area is outside the scope of Modern Chinese Warplanes; however, readers seeking additional information regarding Chinese aircraft manufacturing companies would benefit by combining this book with The Chinese Air Force; Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities by National Defense University Press (Hallion). The remainder of Chapters two and three however, present information that is well-researched and effectively organized into an almost encyclopedic presentation of each aircraft’s unique characteristics, performance parameters, and weaponry. The vibrant pictures and charts are wonderfully placed and provide ample relevance. An especially intriguing inclusion within Chapter 2, especially to military analysts and aircraft enthusiasts, is the sections entitled “Future” at the conclusion of each aircraft’s narrative. These paragraphs provide the reader with tantalizing hints regarding future aircraft developments, variants, and designations – details that would need to be expounded upon in a possible update. Additionally, Chapter four provides a highly-informative explanation of PLA aircraft markings and serial number systems – information neither readily available nor widely understood.

The only thing going against Modern Chinese Warplanes is time, for today the term “modern,” as the book’s title implies, is especially fleeting regarding the modernization of the Chinese military and its air forces. Since the book’s 2012 publication date, further reflected in the 2012 Order of Battle in chapters five and six, numerous changes have occurred within China’s political and military structures that, if the authors and publisher do not address, will quickly render this book irrelevant: In November 2012, Xi Jinping assumed China’s presidency and chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC), quickly embarking on a campaign to reorganize the PLA, including restructuring the existing military regions. This effort was realized in February 2016 as the seven military regions described in Modern Chinese Warplanes were reorganized into five theater commands – a reorganization which also affected the subordinate command structures (Wuthnow). Additionally, in 2013–2014, China initiated substantial dredging and land reclamation projects in the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

These efforts continued, despite international backlash and in the face of a ruling by an international tribunal in The Hague in July 2016 which officially stated that China’s expansive claim to sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea (SCS) had no legal basis. Today, these projects have resulted in three highly-functional artificial islands which are strategically located in the southern portion of the SCS and are fully capable of hosting Chinese military aircraft (Kyodo). Furthermore and more specifically, the PLA has accelerated its 4th and 5th-generation aircraft and armament development programs; therefore, many of the programs or technologies only hinted at within the pages of Modern Chinese Warplanes such as the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter, Shenyang J-15 aircraft carrier-based fighter, and the Xian Y-20 heavy transport aircraft have rapidly progressed to the point of entering service in the PLAAF and/or PLANAF (Adams).

Finally, the PLA continues to initiate or expand military aviation and armament developmental programs. Modern Chinese Warplanes needs to be updated to further reflect the ongoing advances in PLAAF and PLANAF aviation platforms and technologies such as the Shenyang J-31 “Gyrfalcon”/”Falcon Hawk” stealth fighter (Fisher), the CJ-20 long-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM), and the YJ-12 long-range anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) (Roblin).

In Modern Chinese Warplanes, the authors do not dive deep into foreign affairs or military strategy, nor do they embark on theorizing on how the aircraft are or will be operationally integrated into the PLA – foreign affairs experts, military analysts, and political strategists will find little usefulness here. Readers seeking to expand into air power operational integration would benefit by also reading Chapter five of China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities by Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson (Dutton). However, military analysts, history buffs, and even aircraft model aficionados will discover a wonderful and colorful addition to their collection – as a quick reference or an immersive interlude – likely resulting in many dog-eared pages. For any military enthusiast looking to expand his or her knowledge of modern Chinese aviation, this book is certainly a handy reference; however, it should not stand on its own but rather serve as a springboard toward additional research. If not already in the works, this reader personally hopes the authors and publisher collaborate and embark on revised editions that includes updated information and equally stunning photographs so that the 2012 version of Modern Chinese Warplanes will not be lost to the annals of time but rather, much like the PLA itself, will continue “in a process of sustained reform and modernization.”  

LCDR David Barr is a career intelligence officer and currently within the Directorate for Intelligence and Information Operations for U.S. Pacific Fleet. His opinions do not represent those of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the Department of the Navy.

References

Adams, Eric. “China’s New Fighter Jet Can’t Touch the US Planes It Rips Off”; Wired; 07 NOV 2016. https://www.wired.com/2016/11/china-j-20-fighter-jet/

Bedi, R.S. “China: A Threat or a Challenge:  Its Air Power Potential”; Indian Defense Review; 08 March 2017. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/print/?print_post_id=35227

Dutton, Peter, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson. China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities. Newport: U.S. Naval War College; China Maritime Studies, 2014.

Fisher, Richard D Jr. “New details emerge on Shenyang FC-31 fifth-generation export fighter”; IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly; 09 NOV 2016. http://www.janes.com/article/65359/new-details-emerge-on-shenyang-fc-31-fifth-generation-export-fighter

Hallion, Richard, P., Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders. The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012.

Kyodo News. “China tests 2 more airfields in South China Sea”; posted 14 July 2016. http://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/07/14/16/china-tests-2-more-airfields-in-south-china-sea

Roblin, Sebastien. “China’s H-6 Bomber: Everything You Want to Know about Beijing’s ‘B-52’ Circling Taiwan”; The National Interest; 18 DEC 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-h-6-bomber-everything-you-want-know-about-beijings-b-18772

Rupprecht, Andreas, and Tom Cooper. Modern Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation. Houston: Harpia Publishing, 2012.

Wuthnow, Joel and Phillip C. Saunders. “Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications”; National Defense University Press; March 2017. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf?ver=2017-03-21-152018-430

Featured Image: A J-31 stealth fighter (background) of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force lands on a runway after a flying performance at the 10th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, in this November 11, 2014 file photo. (Reuters/Alex Lee)

Harvesting the Electromagnetic Bycatch

By Tim McGeehan

Most Navy bridge watchstanders have had the experience of adjusting their surface-search radar to eliminate sea clutter or rain. In relation to the task of detecting surface ships, these artifacts represent “noise,” just as when one tunes out unwanted transmissions or static to improve radio communications.

However, information can be gleaned indirectly from unintentionally received signals such as these to yield details about the operating environment, and it may reveal the presence, capabilities, and even intent of an adversary. This “electromagnetic bycatch” is a potential gold mine for the Navy’s information warfare community (IWC) in its drive to achieve battlespace awareness, and represents a largely untapped source of competitive advantage in the Navy’s execution of electromagnetic maneuver warfare (EMW).

Electromagnetic Bycatch

The term electromagnetic bycatch describes signals that Navy sensors receive unintentionally. These signals are not the intended target of the sensors and usually are disregarded as noise. This is analogous to the bycatch of the commercial fishing industry, defined as “fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use, and includes economic discards [edible but not commercially viable for the local market] and regulatory discards [prohibited to keep based on species, sex, or size].”1

The amount of fisheries bycatch is significant, with annual global estimates reaching twenty million tons.2 Navy sensor systems also receive a significant volume of bycatch, as evidenced by efforts to drive down false-alarm rates, operator training to recognize and discard artifacts on system displays, and the extensive use of processing algorithms to filter and clean sensor data and extract the desired signal. Noise in the sensor’s internal components may necessitate some of this processing, but many algorithms aim to remove artifacts from outside the sensor (i.e., the sensor is detecting some sort of phenomenon in addition to the targeted one).

U.S. and international efforts are underway to reduce fishing bycatch by using more-selective fishing gear and methods.3 Likewise, there are efforts to reduce electromagnetic bycatch, with modifications to Navy sensors and processing algorithms via new installations, patches, and upgrades. However, it is unlikely that either form of bycatch ever will be eliminated completely. Recognition of this within the fishing industry has given rise to innovative efforts such as Alaska’s “bycatch to food banks” program that allows fishermen to donate their bycatch to feed the hungry instead of discarding it at sea.4 This begs the question: Can the Navy repurpose its electromagnetic bycatch too?

The answer is yes. Navy leaders have called for innovative ideas to help meet twenty-first century challenges, and do to so in a constrained fiscal environment. At the Sea-Air-Space Symposium in 2015, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, then-Chief of Naval Operations, called for the Navy to reuse and repurpose what it already has on hand.5 Past materiel examples include converting ballistic-missile submarines to guided-missile submarines; converting Alaska-class tankers to expeditionary transfer docks (ESDs), then to expeditionary mobile bases (ESBs); and, more recently, repurposing the SM-6 missile from an anti-air to an anti-surface and anti-ballistic missile role.6 However, the Navy needs to go even further, extending this mindset from the materiel world to the realm of raw sensor data to repurpose electromagnetic bycatch.

Over The River and To The Moon

The potential value of bycatch that U.S. fisheries alone discard exceeds one billion dollars annually (for context, the annual U.S. fisheries catch is valued at about five billion dollars).7 Likewise, the Navy previously has found high-value signals in its electromagnetic bycatch.

In 1922, Albert Taylor and Leo Young, two engineers working at the Naval Aircraft Radio Laboratory in Washington, DC, were exploring the use of high-frequency waves as new communication channels for the Navy. They deployed their equipment on the two sides of the Potomac River and observed the communication signals between them. Soon the signals began to fade in and out slowly. The engineers realized that the source of the interference was ships moving past on the river.8 Taylor forwarded a letter to the Bureau of Engineering that described a proposed application of this discovery:

If it is possible to detect, with stations one half mile apart, the passage of a wooden vessel, it is believed that with suitable parabolic reflectors at transmitter and receiver, using a concentrated instead of a diffused beam, the passage of vessels, particularly of steel vessels (warships) could be noted at much greater distances. Possibly an arrangement could be worked out whereby destroyers located on a line a number of miles apart could be immediately aware of the passage of an enemy vessel between any two destroyers in the line, irrespective of fog, darkness or smoke screen. It is impossible to say whether this idea is a practical one at the present stage of the work, but it seems worthy of investigation.9

However, this appeal fell on deaf ears; the idea was not considered worthy of additional study. Later, in 1930, after it was demonstrated that aircraft also could be detected, the newly formed Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) moved forward and developed the early pulsed radio detection systems whose successors are still in use today.10 What started as degradations in radio communication signals (owing to objects blocking the propagation path) evolved to being the signal of interest itself. Today that bycatch is used extensively for revealing the presence of adversaries, navigating safely, and enforcing the speed limit. It is known as RAdio Detection And Ranging, or simply by its acronym: RADAR.

Notebook entry of James H. Trexler, dated 28 January 1945, showing calculations for a long-distance communications link between Los Angeles, California, and Washington, D.C., via the Moon. (Courtesy of the Naval Research Laboratory)

During World War II, Navy radar and radio receivers became increasingly sensitive and began picking up stray signals from around the world. Instead of discarding these signals, the Navy set out to collect them. The NRL Radio Division had been investigating this phenomenon since the mid-1920s, and in 1945 NRL established a Countermeasures Branch, which had an interest in gathering random signals arriving via these “anomalous propagation” paths.11 By 1947, it had erected antennas at its Washington, DC, field site to intercept anomalous signals from Europe and the Soviet Union.12 Just the year before, the Army Signal Corps had detected radio waves bounced off the moon. The convergence of these events set the stage for one of the most innovative operations of the Cold War.

NRL engineer James Trexler, a member of the Countermeasures Branch, advocated exploiting the moon-bounce phenomenon for electronic intelligence (ELINT). He outlined his idea in a 1948 notebook entry:

From the RCM [Radio Counter Measures] point of view this system hold[s] promise as a communication and radar intercept device for signals that cannot be studied at close range where normal propagation is possible. It might be well to point out that many radars are very close to the theoretical possibility of contacting the Moon (the MEW [actually BMEWS, for Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] for example) and hence the practicability of building a system capable of intercepting these systems by reflections from the Moon is not beyond the realm of possibility.13

Trexler’s idea addressed a particular intelligence gap, namely the parameters of air- and missile-defense radars located deep within the Soviet border. With an understanding of these parameters, the capabilities of the systems could be inferred. This was information of strategic importance. As friendly ground and airborne collection systems could not achieve the required proximity to intercept these particular radar signals, the moon-bounce method provided a way ahead. All that was required was for both the Soviet radar and the distant collection site to have the moon in view at the same time. What followed were NRL’s Passive Moon Relay experiments (known as PAMOR) and ultimately the Intelligence Community’s Moon Bounce ELINT program, which enjoyed long success at collecting intelligence on multiple Soviet systems.14

Around this time, the Navy grew concerned about ionospheric disturbances that affected long-range communications.15 So the service employed the new moon-bounce propagation path to yield another Navy capability, the communications moon relay. This enabled reliable communications between Washington, DC, and Hawaii, and later the capability to communicate to ships at sea.16 Thus, what started as bycatch led to a search for the sources of stray signals, revealed adversary air- and missile-defense capabilities, and ultimately led to new communications capabilities for the Navy.

Extracting the Electromagnetic Terrain

Signals in the electromagnetic spectrum do not propagate in straight lines. Rather, they refract or bend on the basis of their frequency and variations in the atmospheric properties of humidity, temperature, and pressure. Signals can encounter conditions that direct them upward into space, bend them downward over the horizon, or trap them in ducts that act as wave guides. Knowing this electromagnetic terrain is critical to success in EMW, and can prove instrumental in countering adversary anti-access/area-denial capabilities.

Variation in electromagnetic propagation paths can lead to shortened or extended radar and communications ranges. Depending on the mission and the situation, this can be an advantage or a vulnerability. Shortened ranges may lead to holes or blind spots in radar coverage. This information could drive a decision for an alternate laydown of forces to mitigate these blind spots. It also could aid spectrum management, allowing multiple users of the same frequency to operate in closer proximity without affecting one another. Alternatively, extended radar ranges can allow one to “see” farther, pushing out the range at which one can detect, classify, and identify contacts. Signals of interest could be collected from more distant emitters. However, the adversary also can take advantage of extended ranges and detect friendly forces at a greater distance via radar, or passively collect friendly emissions. Identifying this situation could prompt one to sector, reduce power, or secure the emitter.

As the weather constantly changes, so too does signal propagation and the resultant benefit or vulnerability. Understanding these effects is critical to making informed decisions on managing emitters and balancing sensor coverage against the signature presented to the adversary. However, all these applications rely on sufficient meteorological data, which typically is sparse in space and time. More frequent and more distributed atmospheric sampling would give the U.S. Navy more-complete awareness of changing conditions and increase its competitive advantage.

Luckily, Navy radar sensors already collect a meteorological bycatch. Normally it is filtered out as noise, but emerging systems can extract it. The Hazardous Weather Detection and Display Capability (HWDDC) is a system that takes a passive tap from the output of the SPS-48 air-search radar (located on most big-deck amphibious ships and carriers) and repurposes it like a Doppler weather radar.17 Besides providing real-time weather information to support operations and flight safety, it can stream data to the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center in Monterey, California, to feed atmospheric models. With this data, the models can generate better weather forecasts and drive electromagnetic propagation models for prediction of radar and communications-system performance.18 The Tactical Environmental Processor (TEP) will perform the same function by extracting atmospheric data from the SPY-1 radar.19

By passively using the existing radar feeds, HWDDC and TEP provide new capabilities while avoiding additional requirements for power, space, frequency deconfliction, and overall system integration that would be associated with adding a new radar, antenna, or weather sensor. There also is the potential to extract refractivity data from the radar returns of sea clutter.20 The multitude of radar platforms in the Navy’s inventory represents an untapped opportunity to conduct “through the sensor” environmental data collection in support of battlespace awareness.

Likewise, the Global Positioning System (GPS) also collects meteorological bycatch. As GPS signals pass through the atmosphere, they are affected by the presence of water vapor, leading to errors in positioning. The receiver or processing software makes corrections, modeling the water vapor effect to compensate, thereby obtaining accurate receiver positions. However, water vapor is a key meteorological variable. If the receiver location is already known, the error can be analyzed to extract information about the water vapor, and by using multiple receivers, its three-dimensional distribution can be reconstructed.21 Instead of dumping the bycatch of water vapor, it can be (and is) assimilated into numerical weather prediction models for improved short-range (three-, six-, and twelve-hour) precipitation forecasts.22

Do Not Adjust Your Set

There is also great potential to harvest bycatch from routine broadcast signals. While a traditional radar system emits its own pulse of energy that bounces back to indicate the presence of an object, passive systems take advantage of signals already present in the environment, such as television and radio broadcasts or even signals from cell towers or GPS.23 These signals propagate, encounter objects, and reflect off. This leads to the “multipath effect,” in which a transmitted signal bounces off different objects, then arrives at the same receiver at slightly different times owing to the varied distances traveled. (This is what used to cause the “ghost” effect on television, in which an old image seemed to remain on screen momentarily even as the new image was displayed.) Variations in this effect can be used to infer the presence or movement of an object that was reflecting the signals.

In a related concept, “multistatic” systems collect these reflections with multiple, geographically separated receivers, then process the signals to detect, locate, and track these objects in real time.24 These systems have proved effective. In a 2002 demonstration, Lockheed Martin’s Silent Sentry system tracked all the air traffic over Washington, DC, using only FM radio and television signal echoes.25 More recently, another passive system went beyond simple tracking and actually classified a contact as a small, single-propeller aircraft by using ambient FM radio signals to determine its propeller rotation rate.26 This level of detail, combined with maneuvering behavior, operating profiles, and deviations from associated pattern-of-life trends, could even give clues to adversary intent.

Passive radar systems have many advantages. They emit no energy of their own, which increases their survivability because they do not reveal friendly platform location and are not susceptible to anti-radiation weapons. They do not add to a crowded spectrum, nor do they need to be deconflicted from other systems because of electromagnetic interference. The receivers can be mounted on multiple fixed or mobile platforms. Technological advances in processing and computing power have taken much of the guesswork out of using passive systems by automating correlation and identification. Moving forward, there is great potential to leverage radar-like passive detection systems.

That being said, operators of the passive radar systems described may require extensive training to achieve proficiency. Even though the systems are algorithm- and processing-intensive, they may require a significant level of operator interaction to select the best signals to use and to reconfigure the network of receivers continually, particularly in a dynamic combat environment when various broadcasts begin to go offline. Likewise, the acquisition, distribution, placement, and management of the many receivers for multistatic systems (and their associated communications links) is a fundamental departure from the traditional employment of radar, and will require new concepts of operations and doctrine for employment and optimization. These efforts could be informed by ongoing work or lessons learned from the surface warfare community’s “distributed lethality” concept, which also involves managing dispersed platforms and capabilities.27

Challenges and Opportunities

Among the services, the Navy in particular has the potential to gain much from harvesting the electromagnetic bycatch. During war or peace, the Navy operates forward around the world, providing it unique access to many remote locations that are particularly sparse on data. Use of ships provides significant dwell time on station without requiring basing rights. Navy platforms tend to be sensor intensive, and so provide the means for extensive data collection. This extends from automated, routine meteorological observations that feed near-term forecasts and long-term environmental databases to preconflict intelligence-gathering applications that include mapping out indigenous signals for passive systems to use later.28 The mobility of Navy platforms allows for multiple units to be brought to bear, scaling up the effect to create increased capacity when necessary.

However, there are many challenges to overcome. The Navy soon may find itself “swimming in sensors and drowning in data”; managing this information will require careful consideration.29 Returning to the fishing analogy, to avoid wasting bycatch fishermen need to identify what they have caught in their nets, find someone who can use it, temporarily store it, transport it back to port, and get it to the customer before it spoils. Likewise, the Navy needs to dig into the sensor data and figure out exactly what extra information it has gathered, identify possible applications, determine how to store it, transfer it to customers, and exploit it while it is still actionable.

This hinges most on the identification of electromagnetic bycatch in the first place. As automation increases, sensor feeds should be monitored continuously for anomalies. Besides serving to notify operators when feeds are running outside normal parameters, such anomalous data streams should be archived and analyzed periodically by the scientists and engineers of the relevant systems command (SYSCOM) to determine the presence, nature, and identity of unexpected signals. Once a signal is identified, the SYSCOM team would need to cast a wide net to determine whether the signal has a possible application, with priority given to satisfying existing information needs, intelligence requirements, and science and technology objectives.30 

History has shown that this is a nontrivial task; remember that the original discovery and proposed application of radar were dismissed. If the unplanned signal is determined to have no current use, it should be noted for possible future exploitation. Subsequent sensor upgrades, algorithm improvements, and software patches then should strive to eliminate the signal from future incidental collection. If there is potential value in the incidental signal, upgrades, algorithms, and patches should optimize its continued reception along with the original signal via the same sensor, or possibly even demonstrate a requirement for a new sensor optimized for the new signal. The identified uses for the electromagnetic bycatch will drive the follow-on considerations of what and how much data to store for later exploitation and what data needs to be offloaded immediately within the limited bandwidth owing to its value or time sensitivity.

The analogy to fisheries bycatch also raises a regulatory aspect. Much as a fisherman may find that he has caught a prohibited catch (possibly even an endangered species) that he cannot retain, the same holds true for electromagnetic bycatch. It is possible that an incidental signal might reveal information about U.S. citizens or entities. Once the signal is identified, intelligence oversight (IO) requirements would drive subsequent actions. Navy IO programs regulate all Navy intelligence activities, operations, and programs, ensuring that they function in compliance with applicable U.S. laws, directives, and policies.31 IO requirements likely would force the SYSCOM to alter the sensor’s mode of operation or develop upgrades, algorithms, and patches to avoid future collection of the signal.

The Role of the Information Warfare Community

The Navy’s IWC is ideally suited to play a key role in responding to these challenges. Its personnel have experience across the diverse disciplines of intelligence, cryptology, electronic warfare, meteorology and oceanography (METOC), communications, and space operations, and assembling these different viewpoints might reveal instances in which one group can use another’s bycatch for a completely different application. IWC officers now come together to make connections and exchange expertise in formal settings such as the Information Warfare Basic Course and the Information Warfare Officer Milestone and Department Head Course. Further cross-pollination is increasing owing to the cross-detailing of officers among commands of different designators. Recent reorganization of carrier strike group staffs under the Information Warfare Commander construct has increased and institutionalized collaboration in operational settings. Restructuring has trickled down even to the platform level, where, for example, the METOC division has been realigned under the Intelligence Department across the carrier force. As a net result of these changes, the IWC has a unique opportunity to have new eyes looking at the flows of sensor data, providing warfighter perspectives in addition to the SYSCOM sensor review described above.

The Navy also can capitalize on the collective IWC’s extensive experience and expertise with issues pertaining to data collection, processing, transport, bandwidth management, archiving, and exploitation. Furthermore, the different components of the IWC share a SYSCOM (the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, or SPAWAR); a resource sponsor (OPNAV N2/N6); a type commander (Navy Information Forces); a warfighting-development center (the Navy Information Warfighting Development Center); and a training group (the Navy Information Warfare Training Group will be established by the end of 2017). This positions the IWC to collaborate across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities  (DOTMLPF) spectrum. This will support shared ideas and unified approaches regarding the employment of emerging capabilities such as the machine-learning and “big-data” analytics that will sift through future electromagnetic bycatch. Ultimately, the members of the IWC can forge a unified way forward to develop the next generation of sensors, data assimilators, and processors.

Conclusion

While the Navy might not recognize exactly what it has, its sensors are collecting significant amounts of electromagnetic bycatch. The Navy’s forward presence positions it to collect volumes of unique data with untold potential. The associated electromagnetic bycatch is being used now, previously has yielded game-changing capabilities, and could do so again with future applications. Instead of stripping and discarding it during data processing, the Navy needs to take an objective look at what it can salvage and repurpose to gain competitive advantage. The fishing bycatch dumped every year could feed millions of people; the Navy needs to use its electromagnetic bycatch to feed new capabilities. Don’t dump it!

Tim McGeehan is a U.S. Navy Officer currently serving in Washington.  

The ideas presented are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.

[1] Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (2) (1976), available at www.law.cornell.edu/.

[2] United Nations, International Guidelines on Bycatch Management and Reduction of Discards (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011), p. 2, available at www.fao.org/.

[3] Ibid., p. 13; Lee R. Benaka et al., eds., U.S. National Bycatch Report First Edition Update 1 (Silver Spring, MD: NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, December 2013), available at www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/.

[4] Laine Welch, “Gulf Bycatch Will Help Feed the Hungry,” Alaska Dispatch News, June 4, 2011, www.adn.com/; Laine Welch, “Bycatch to Food Banks Outgrows Its Beginnings,” Alaska Fish Radio, August 3, 2016, www.alaskafishradio.com/.

[5] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Tablets & Tomahawks: Navy, Marines Scramble to Innovate,” Breaking Defense, April 13, 2015, breakingdefense.com/.

[6] Sam Lagrone, “SECDEF Carter Confirms Navy Developing Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile for Cruisers, Destroyers,” USNI News, February 4, 2016, news.usni.org/; Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Conducts SM-6 MRBM Intercept Test,” news release, December 14, 2016, www.mda.mil/.

[7] Amanda Keledjian et al., “Wasted Cash: The Price of Waste in the U.S. Fishing Industry,” Oceana (2014), p. 1, available at oceana.org/.

[8] David Kite Allison, New Eye for the Navy: The Origin of Radar at the Naval Research Laboratory, NRL Report 8466 (Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory, 1981), p. 39, available at www.dtic.mil/.

[9] Ibid, p. 40.

[10] “Development of the Radar Principle,” U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, n.d., www.nrl.navy.mil/.

[11] David K. van Keuren, “Moon in Their Eyes: Moon Communication Relay at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1951–1962,” in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew J. Butrica (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1995), available at history.nasa.gov/.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Frank Eliot, “Moon Bounce ELINT,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 2, 1996, www.cia.gov/.

[15] Van Keuren, “Moon in Their Eyes.”

[16] Pennsylvania State Univ., From the Sea to the Stars: A Chronicle of the U.S. Navy’s Space and Space-Related Activities, 1944–2009 (State College, PA: Applied Research Laboratory, 2010), available at edocs.nps.edu/; Van Keuren, “Moon in Their Eyes.”

[17] SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific, “Hazardous Weather Detection & Display Capability (HWDDC),” news release, n.d., www.public.navy.mil/; Timothy Maese et al., “Hazardous Weather Detection and Display Capability for US Navy Ships” (paper presented at the 87th annual meeting of the American Meteorological Society, San Antonio, TX, January 16, 2007), available at ams.confex.com/.

[18] Tim Maese and Randy Case, “Extracting Weather Data from a Hybrid PAR” (presentation, Second National Symposium on Multifunction Phased Array Radar, Norman, OK, November 18, 2009), available at bcisensors.com/.

[19] Hank Owen, “Tactical Environmental Processor At-Sea Demonstration,” DTIC, 1998, www.handle.dtic.mil/.

[20] Ted Rogers, “Refractivity-from-Clutter,” DTIC, 2012, www.dtic.mil/.

[21] Richard B. Langley, “Innovation: Better Weather Prediction Using GPS,” GPS World, July 1, 2010, gpsworld.com/.

[22] Steven Businger, “Applications of GPS in Meteorology” (presentation, CGSIC Regional Meeting, Honolulu, HI, June 23–24, 2009), available at www.gps.gov/; Tracy Lorraine Smith et al., “Short-Range Forecast Impact from Assimilation of GPS-IPW Observations into the Rapid Update Cycle,” Monthly Weather Review 135 (August 2007),  available at journals.ametsoc.org/; Hans-Stefan Bauer et al., “Operational Assimilation of GPS Slant Path Delay Measurements into the MM5 4DVAR System,” Tellus A 63 (2011), available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.

[23] Lockheed Martin Corp., “Lockheed Martin Announces ‘Silent Sentry(TM)’ Surveillance System; Passive System Uses TV-Radio Signals to Detect, Track Airborne Objects,” PR Newswire, October 12, 1998, www.prnewswire.com/; Otis Port, “Super-Radar, Done Dirt Cheap,” Bloomberg, October 20, 2003, www.bloomberg.com/.

[24] Lockheed Martin Corp., “Silent Sentry: Innovative Technology for Passive, Persistent Surveillance,” news release, 2005, available at www.mobileradar.org/.

[25] Port, “Super-Radar, Done Dirt Cheap.”

[26] F. D. V. Maasdorp et al., “Simulation and Measurement of Propeller Modulation Using FM Broadcast Band Commensal Radar,” Electronics Letters 49, no. 23 (November 2013), pp. 1481–82, available at ieeexplore.ieee.org/.

[27] Thomas Rowden [Vice Adm., USN], Peter Gumataotao [Rear Adm., USN], and Peter Fanta [Rear Adm., USN], “Distributed Lethality,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141/1/1,343 (January 2015), available at www.usni.org/.

[28] “Automated Shipboard Weather Observation System,” Office of Naval Research, n.d., www.onr.navy.mil/.

[29] Stew Magnuson, “Military ‘Swimming in Sensors and Drowning in Data,’” National Defense, January 2010; www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/.

[30] U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Science and Technology Strategy: Innovations for the Future Force (Arlington, VA: Office of Naval Research, 2015), available at www.navy.mil/.

[31] “Intelligence Oversight Division,” Department of the Navy, Office of Inspector General, n.d., www.secnav.navy.mil/.

Featured Image: ARABIAN GULF (March 4, 2016) Electronics Technician 3rd Class Jordan Issler conducts maintenance on a radar aboard aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Justin R. Pacheco/Released)

Building an Asymmetric Ukrainian Naval Force to Defend the Sea of Azov Pt. 1

The following two-part series will analyze the maritime dimension of competition between Ukraine and Russia in the Sea of Azov. Part 1 analyzes strategic interests, developments, and geography in the Sea of Azov along with probable Russian avenues of aggression. Part 2 will devise potential asymmetric naval capabilities and strategies for the Ukrainian Navy to employ.

By Jason Y. Osuga

“The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly to secure the command of the sea, or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”1 Sir Julian Corbett

Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, under the Partnership for Peace, and closer association with the European Union, have stirred Russian sensitivity and suspicion of Ukrainian and Western intentions.2 In 2014, Ukrainian President Yanukovych declined to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union to expand bilateral trade. Instead, he signed a trade agreement with Russia. Consequently, Ukrainians took to the streets of Kyiv in the Euromaidan protests, which led to the ouster of President Yanukovych. The new President, Poroshenko, refused to sign the 25-year extension on the lease of Sevastopol naval base in Crimea to the Russian Navy. Russia responded immediately by taking over Sevastopol and Crimea through Russian proxies clad in unmarked fatigues. To date, Russia has not returned Crimea and its naval base in Sevastopol. Ukraine must be able to defend its borders and sovereignty so that it can contribute to the stability of the Black Sea region.          

Current constrained budgets necessitate that Ukraine pursue a pragmatic maritime strategy grounded in the following geopolitical realities: it will not be a NATO ally, it will not have a great sophisticated navy, and it can no longer rely on Russia’s defense. If Ukraine continues on the current path, Ukrainian Navy’s weakness, Russia’s need to resupply Crimea, and Kerch Strait Bridge construction delays will tempt Russia to gain control of the Sea of Azov (SOA) to establish a land corridor between Russia and Crimea through the Donbas and Priazovye Regions. Therefore, a new Ukrainian maritime strategy must defend the SOA and deter Russian encroachment by building an asymmetric force, conducting joint sea denial operations, and establishing a naval base in Mariupol and forward-deploying a part of its fleet to the SOA.

Figure 1. Sea of Azov, Kerch Strait, and Crimea. (Google Maps)

Russian Motivations, Ukrainian Weakness, and Russian Operational Ideas

Since the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Russia and Ukraine have failed to agree on the demarcation of maritime borders in the SOA and Kerch Straits.3 In Ukraine’s National Security Strategy published in March 2015, President Poroshenko defined current security challenges that exist below the threat level, but could elevate into a more robust military threat. Specifically, it cited the unfinished border demarcation in the Black Sea and SOA as a potential flashpoint.4 Ukraine has responsibilities to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the SOA and Black Sea under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS).5 Ukraine has insisted on designating the SOA as an open sea under UNCLOS, as it links directly to the Black Sea and the world’s oceans.6 The Russian Government has, however, rejected Ukrainian claims. As an alternative, Russia called on Kyiv to abide by a 2003 agreement signed by the previous Ukrainian Government, which designated SOA as internal waters of Russia and Ukraine to be jointly owned, managed, and unregulated by international law.7 More recently, Ukraine has instituted arbitration proceedings against Russia under UNCLOS to adhere to maritime zones adjacent to Crimea in the Black Sea, SOA, and Kerch Strait.8 As a result, Ukraine asserts that Russia has usurped Ukrainian maritime rights in these zones. However, these legal actions have not halted Russian maritime aggression. In mid-September 2016, Russian vessels illegally seized Ukrainian oil rigs in the region and chased Ukrainian vessels out of the area.9 Tensions continue to mount as Russia solidifies its gains in Crimea, extending to offshore claims against Ukraine.

Resource Discovery

Russia and Ukraine’s relationship has shown no sign of improvement as more resources are discovered on its seabed. Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and other major oil companies have explored the Black Sea, and some petroleum analysts say its potential may rival the North Sea.10 In addition, natural gas exploration has availed as many as 13 gas and dry gas deposits with a combined 75 billion cubic meters (bcm) of prospected resources discovered on the shelf, seven in the Black Sea and six in the SOA.11 Subsequently, three new gas deposits have been found on the southern Azov Sea shelf. Since taking over Crimea, Russia has made new maritime claims around Crimea in the SOA and Black Sea (see Figures 2 & 3 showing Russian maritime claims before and after Crimea’s annexation). President Vladimir Putin declared the “Azov-Black Sea basin is in Russia’s zone of strategic interests,” because it provides Russia with direct access to the most important global transport routes.12 In addition to commercial routes, keeping hydrocarbon resources from Ukraine is clearly among Russia’s interests.

Figure 2. Sea Claims Prior to Russian Annexation of Crimea (Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory13)
Figure 3. New Russian Claims following Crimea Annexation in Black Sea and SOA.14

Possible Russian Designs on a Land Corridor

In addition to having access to the sea, Russia could also seek a land corridor connecting Crimea to Russia through the Donbas Region.15 There are at least two primary reasons for Russian leadership’s desire to encroach further on Ukraine’s territory. First, Russia needs to protect new claims in the Crimea, SOA, Black Sea, and its maritime resources. Second, Russia needs to increase the capacity to resupply Crimea through a land corridor connecting Crimea to Russia. Since the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine closed the northern borders of Crimea and Ukraine. This forces Russia to supply Crimea with food and basic wares from the sea, mainly via ferries across the Kerch Strait from Krasnodar Region to Crimea. The reliance on a single ferry system could cause a bottleneck in traffic when it reaches a daily limit on supplies carried across the Strait. Crimea depends heavily on Russia to fulfill basic services, with 75 percent of its budget last year coming from Moscow, in addition to supplying Crimea with daily electricity rationing.16 A land line of communication (LOC) via a road between Crimea and Russia would alleviate the burden of supplying Crimea by sea only. The highway along the Azov coast is the shortest link.

Realizing the SLOCs are limited, Russia is building the Kerch Strait Bridge, which will connect the Crimean Peninsula to Russia. Until its completion in 2019, however, there is no land LOC to sustain the economy and bases in Crimea. Therefore, SOA carries significance for its sea line of communication (SLOC) from Russia to Crimea. Protection of this SLOC is Russia’s main objective to consolidate its gains and secure sustainment of Crimean bases. Only then would Russia be able to use Crimea as a lily pad for power projection into the Black Sea.

The Kerch Strait Bridge construction, however, is beset with delays. Due to sanctions placed on Russia by the E.U. and the U.S., Russia is in dire financial straits which puts the completion of the bridge at risk. The construction cost of the bridge is expected to cost more than $5 billion as construction delays mount.17 Unpaid workers are quitting the project in protest over dangerous working conditions.18 With uncertainty over the bridge’s construction and overcapacity of the ferry, the need for land routes to Crimea becomes even greater. Because Ukraine closed its borders to Crimea in protest against Russian occupation, Russia must forcibly establish a LOC. In order to establish a LOC corridor, Russia must control the SOA.

Kerch Strait Bridge construction footage (Sputnik/June 2017)

Ukraine’s Weak Navy

The Ukrainian Navy is old, chronically underfunded, and too small to effectively counter potential Russian aggression previously described. Ukraine’s land and air forces receive the lion-share of defense spending.19 Lack of spending on the Ukrainian Navy is a distinct disadvantage in maritime security of the SOA. The Ukrainian Navy consists of 15,000 sailors and 30 combat ships and support vessels, of which only six ships are truly combat capable while the rest are auxiliaries and support vessels.20 All in all, Ukraine lacks the capabilities to protect the now less than 350 kilometers of Azov coastline.21

Defections, low morale and training also plague the Ukraine Navy, decimating its end strength. Many sailors defected to Russia during the Crimea crisis.22 There is a systemic failure to invest in training and personnel, with housing shortages and low personnel pay depressing morale and retention.23 Old ammunition stockpiles adds to training issues. Ukraine will not win a symmetrical engagement on the open water against the Russian navy. As a result, Ukraine must seek comparative advantages in the asymmetric realm by addressing tangible and intangible issues in force structure, doctrine, morale, and training.

Theater Geometry and Interior Lines of Attack

 If Russia were to strike at the Ukrainian Achilles’ heel, it would attack from the sea taking advantage of Russia’s dominance in the SOA and Kerch Strait vice attacking on land. This is due to the Ukrainian Army being a more sizeable and proficient force compared to the Navy that is weak and underfunded.24 Russia’s control of Crimea shortens its line of operations (LOO) into eastern Ukraine. With uncontested control of SOA, Russian transports will have the freedom of maneuver to assemble forces in the SOA and utilize interior lines of attack along the [Ukrainian] coast.25 Russia will be able to maximize three enabling functions to increase combat power: sustainment using shorter SLOCs, protection of its transports and flanks by gaining sea control to then conduct amphibious landings, and establishment of effective command and control (C2) of forward-deployed forces through shorter lines of operations and an advantage in factor space. Consequently, Russia will be able to increase combat power of its limited “hybrid” troops to seize objectives ashore. Therefore, a strong navy is necessary to deny Russian forces from using the sea to seize the Azov coast.

Figure 4. Notional Russian amphibious attack vector using interior lines from assembly point in Sea of Azov. . Roads along the coast connect Crimea to Russia. Russia’s Ultimate Objective is Mariupol w/ Intermediate Objectives along E58. (Google Maps)

Seizing Opportunity and The Russian Operational Idea

Strategically, Russia will weigh the benefit of seizing more Ukrainian territory to establish a LOC between Crimea and Russia against the costs of likely Western sanctions or retaliations. Russia will seize the initiative upon any perceived Ukrainian or international weakness that presents an opportunity. Russian Op idea would be to reach objectives along the Azov coast with speed, surprise, and plausible deniability using amphibious crafts Ropucha and Alligator-class LSTs, LCM landing crafts, and LCUA/LCPA air cushion landing crafts or a combination with commercial ships/boats.26 Hybrid forces clad in civilian clothing will use speed, surprise, and plausible deniability to seize decisive points along the Azov coast maximizing the shortened LOO/LOC to seize the ultimate objective of Mariupol.

Russia will seize on Ukraine’s critical weakness—sporadic or non-existent naval presence in the SOA. The Russian Navy will assert sea control in the SOA, and attempt to close Mariupol port through a blockade. Russia’s critical strengths and operational center of gravity (COG) are its well-trained and commanded special and ground forces, which are key to seizing territory and linking the Crimean Peninsula to Russia by land. Separatist forces from the Donbas Region will support by encircling Mariupol from the north. The Russian Navy and Air Force will likely support the ground offensives through naval gunfire, land-attack missiles, and air support to attack defensive positions along beaches and cities. Russia will ensure unity of command between the special forces, navy, and separatist forces by maximizing functions of intelligence, C2, sustainment, fires, and protection combined with principles of war such as speed, initiative, surprise, deniability, and concentration of force to enable success.

Russia will complement the offensive using hybrid warfare techniques such as a strategic media blitz and cyber warfare to win the war of the narrative and global opinion. Various Russian media outlets such as RT will broadcast the Russian strategic narrative that it will protect Russian speakers in the near abroad and will reunite inherently Russian territory back to the motherland. Furthermore, Russia will use the cyber domain not only to carry out media warfare, but will use it to attack Ukrainian government websites and infrastructure through denial of service attacks and more sophisticated cyber-attack vectors. Thus, cyberspace will be a key domain of its main attack vector in addition to air, sea, and land.

Part 2 will devise potential asymmetric naval capabilities and strategies for the Ukrainian Navy to employ.

LCDR Jason Yuki Osuga is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe Center and the U.S. Naval War College.  This essay was originally written for the Joint Military Operations course at NWC.

These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of any government agency.

[1] Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 87.

[2] Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 56.

[3] Deborah Sanders, “Ukraine’s Maritime Power in the Black Sea—A Terminal Decline?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25:17-34, Routledge, 2012, 26.

[4] Maksym Bugriy, “Ukraine’s New Concept Paper on Security and Defense Reform,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, No. 79. April 22, 2016.

[5] Deborah Sanders, “Ukraine’s Maritime Power in the Black Sea—A Terminal Decline?”, 18.

[6] Ibid., 26.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Roman Olearchik, “Ukraine Hits Russia with Another Legal Claim.” Financial Times. September 14, 2016. Accessed October 6, 2016. http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/09/14/ukraine-hits-russia-with-another-legal-claim/.

[9] Ibid.

[10] William J. Broad, “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves.” The New York Times, May 17, 2014. Accessed 10 Oct 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html.

[11] “Ukraine to Tap Gas on Black, Azov Sea Shelf.” Oil and Gas Journal, November 27, 2000. Accessed October 7, 2016. http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-98/issue-48/exploration-development/ukraine-to-tap-gas-on-black-azov-sea-shelf.html.

[12] Deborah Sanders, “U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2007, Vol. 60, No. 3. Newport, RI.  

[13] William J. Broad, “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves.” The New York Times.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Steven Pifer, “The Mariupol Line: Russia’s Land Bridge to Crimea.” Brookings Institution, March 15, 2015. Accessed 24 Sep 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/03/19/the-mariupol-line-russias-land-bridge-to-crimea/.

[16] Ander Osborn, “Putin’s Bridge’ Edges Closer to Annexed Crimea despite Delays.” Reuters, April 18, 2016. Accessed 24 Sep 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-bridge-idUSKCN0XF1YS.

[17] Daria Litvinova, “Why Kerch May Prove a Bridge Too Far for Russia.” The Moscow Times, June 17, 2016. Accessed 30 Sep 2016. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/why-kerch-may-prove-a-bridge-too-far-for-russia-53309.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Amy B. Coffman, James A. Crump, Robbi K. Dickson, and others, “Ukraine’s Military Role in the Black Sea Region,” Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2009, 7.

[20] Eleanor Keymer, Jane’s Fighting Ships, Issue 16 (Surrey, UK: Sentinel House), 2015, 642.

[21] Janusz Bugajski and Peter Doran, “Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe.” Center for European Policy Analysis, Black Sea Strategic Report No.1, February 2016, 8.

[22] Sam LaGrone, “Ukrainian Navy is Slowly Rebuilding,” USNI, May 22, 2014.

[23] Deborah Sanders, “Ukraine’s Maritime Power in the Black Sea—A Terminal Decline?”, 25, 29.

[24] Amy B. Coffman, James A. Crump, Robbi K. Dickson, and others, “Ukraine’s Military Role in the Black Sea Region,” Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2009, 7.

[25] Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), p. IV-52.

[26] Eric Wertheim, Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th edition, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press) 2013, 608-610.

Featured Image: Ukrainian Navy personnel on the day of Naval Forces in 2016 (Ukraine MoD)

Future Capital Ship Week Wraps Up on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured articles offering future capital ship concepts in response to a Call for Articles from the U.S. Naval War College’s Institute for Future Warfare Studies. Authors discussed possibilities for future ship types, concepts of operations for the next generation of capital assets, and unique ideas about what really constitutes a capital capability in the modern era. Read on below to find the Future Capital Ship Topic Week author submissions.

The Network as the Capital Ship by Robert Rubel

“From the galleasses at the Battle of Lepanto to the aircraft carriers of today, the capital ship has been that ship type that is capable of defeating all other types. That is the general and simplistic definition of the term, but to speculate on the future capital ship, we must understand the underlying characteristics of a capital ship and its role in fleet architecture and design. We will start with the ship itself and then move outward to its context and implications for maritime strategy.”

Swarming Sea Mines: Capital Capability? by Zachary Kallenborn

“But what if sea mines could move themselves intelligently and coordinate their actions? They could rove the seas in advance of friendly fleet movements and position themselves into an adversary’s path. Multiple mines could strike a single target. Naval mines could become a critical aspect of seapower. Networks of naval mine swarms could become the future capital ship.”

Return of the Sea Control Ship by Pete Pagano

“Such a platform is the key to the future of maritime warfare not because it is a replacement for the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft carrier, but rather because it is a complement that will free up the larger and all too few fleet nuclear powered aircraft carriers to focus on the power projection mission of striking enemy targets inland during a high intensity conflict.”

An Information Dominance Carrier for Distributed War at Sea by Dmitry Filipoff

“As with what happened in WWII and elsewhere, the Navy and the U.S. military writ large will run the risk of employing tactics and technologies that are not yet fully inculcated into the force if war breaks out. Given the current pace of change, that risk may never go away. What should be clear, at least for now, is that there is still a place for capital ships in high-end warfighting. The distributed fleet of tomorrow can become real if capital ships dedicate themselves toward prosecuting the most important and elusive target of all: information.”

Capital Ship 2035: The Mission Command Vessel (MCV) by Harry Bennett

“The Mission Command Vessel (MCV) capital ship of 2035 is a “key node” in the global U.S. Defense network dominating the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) assigned to it. The vessel is usually supported by, and is at the center of, an accompanying Advanced Task Force (ATF). The MCV integrates their systems and capabilities for maximum combat power and efficiency. It is the ability within an ATF to integrate different weapons systems and different types of vessel to maximum effect that makes the MCV a ‘capital ship.'”

Pitfalls in New Capital Ship Creation by Steve Wills

“There is a lively debate as to what the next capital ship or system will be, but it will still likely be affected by the same financial, technological, and strategic influences that drove past capital ship changes. Any new capital ship must be capable of greater sustained ordnance delivery over time than its predecessor. Given the changes of the last decade in terms of a new era of strategic, great power competition, the rapid advance of many technologies, and financial shortfalls for many nations in terms of naval spending, the question of the next capital ship remains a healthy one open to continued debate.”

Capital Uncertainty by J. Overton

“The essentials of the scenario at this essay’s beginning have been carried out piecemeal against first-rate navies in the last few decades, and yet have either been random acts of violence and vandalism, of incompetence and natural causes, or haven’t left enough evidence to warrant a hard-power state response. This might illicit distaste in proponents of traditional seapower platforms, so once did steam power, iron hulls, submarines, and aircraft carriers. The need, or possible existence, of the most supremely effective naval platform for its era will not be obsolete for as long as nations and peoples use the world’s finite sea lanes and marine resources. But the idea that this platform must, however, be now and for always a ship no longer holds water.”


Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Snow falls on the battleship USS Alabama sometime in 1944 (USN photo # GS-I-7-40465/Navsource.org)